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LovING v. vIrGINIa aS a CIvIL rIGhTS DeCISIoN
 Loving v. Virginia, the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision that invalidated 
state laws restricting interracial marriage, marked the tail end of the civil rights cases 
of the 1950s and ’60s.1 Loving was not issued until 1967, more than a decade after the 
Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, holding racial segregation of public 
schools unconstitutional.2 At the time of the 1963 March on Washington, nineteen 
states still had laws prohibiting interracial marriage,3 and federal jurisprudence 
upholding these laws had remained the same since 1883.4
 Civil rights litigators waited so long to launch an attack on state anti-
miscegenation statutes in federal court because interracial marriage seemed at once 
so trivial and so controversial. Trivial because it involved interpersonal relationships 
rather than the weighty public rights to equal education, voting, and employment. 
But challenging the marriage laws also struck at the bedrock of racism: Classifying 
human beings into supposedly biological races that should be kept apart. Some civil 
rights advocates, as well as justices on the Warren Court, feared that attacking anti-
miscegenation too soon was doomed to fail and would threaten the implementation 
of recent civil rights victories because white Southerners’ loathing of racial 
intermingling was so basic to their dogma of racial separation.5 After all, a primary 
reason for segregated schooling was to foreclose the interracial intimacy that might 
be sparked in integrated classrooms.6 Moreover, prior to Loving, state control over 
marriage was absolute.7
 Loving was the capstone of the Court’s blow to the Jim Crow regime. As the 
Court stated, it struck down the Virginia law because it was a measure “designed to 
maintain White Supremacy.”8 Yet subsequent decades have faded the understanding 
of Loving as a civil rights decision. While Brown became the emblem of the end to de 
1. 388 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1967).
2. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
3. Peter Wallenstein, Tell the Court I Love My Wife: Race, Marriage, and Law—An 
American History 204 (2002) (“[I]n 1962, Arizona repealed its miscegenation law, and Utah and 
Nebraska followed the next year. That left 19 states . . . .”).
4. Id. at 173, 180; see also Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 583, 585 (1883) (upholding a law that punished 
proscribed interracial sex more harshly than proscribed sex with someone of the same race).
5. See Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 201–14 (“[I]nterracial marriage was often what opponents of change 
voiced as their central concern.”).
6. See Reginald Oh, Defining the Voices of Critical Race Feminism: Interracial Marriage in the Shadows of Jim 
Crow, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1321, 1324 (2006) (interpreting school segregation as a form of anti-
miscegenation); Herbert Ravenel Sass, Mixed Schools and Mixed Blood 8–9 (1956) reprinted in 
Herbert Ravenel Sass, Mixed Schools and Mixed Blood, Atlantic, Nov. 1956, at 48 (“[T]he elementary 
public school is the most critical of those areas of activity where the South must and will at all costs 
maintain separateness of the races.”); Gene Sherman, South’s Most Deep-Rooted Fear: Inter-Racial 
Marriage, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1961, at 2 (“Miscegenation is a deep-rooted fear and unquestionably one 
of the foremost concerns of the Southern citizen.”).
7. See John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of Loving, 51 How. L.J. 15, 32–33 (2007) 
(noting that Loving ended unlimited state control over marriage that had been established by the Court 
in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888)).
8. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
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jure segregation, Loving fell into relative obscurity. In his recent book, The Civil 
Rights Revolution, constitutional law scholar Bruce Ackerman denies that Loving 
“deserves a central place in the civil rights canon.”9 The same-sex marriage movement 
revived the decision to stand for the right to marry the partner of one’s choice.10 In 
2007, on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Loving decision, Mildred 
Loving commented:
I am proud that Richard’s and my name is on a court case that can help 
reinforce the love, the commitment, the fairness, and the family that so many 
people, black or white, young or old, gay or straight seek in life. I support the 
freedom to marry for all. That’s what Loving, and loving, are all about.11
Today, Loving is remembered more for protecting the right to marry than for toppling 
the final pillar of the de jure racial caste system in the United States. Moreover, to the 
extent that federal courts rely on Loving as a civil rights decision, they have largely 
distorted its reasoning, as well as its significance to the struggle to end racism and 
white domination.12
 This article aims to revive Loving as a civil rights decision, and to stress the 
continuing importance of its recognition of the relationship between racial 
classifications and white supremacy. Part I places the Lovings’ lawsuit in the context 
of the litigation agenda that helped institute the civil rights revolution. Jim Crow 
restrictions on marriage implemented the combined white supremacist and eugenicist 
ideologies of an innate racial hierarchy that called for racial separation. Both civil 
rights lawyers and U.S. Supreme Court justices delayed tackling state anti-
miscegenation laws for strategic reasons. But they understood these laws as part of the 
Jim Crow segregationist system that the civil rights movement was dismantling and 
kept their abolition as an eventual goal.
 Part II analyzes the Loving decision as a challenge to racism and white supremacy 
as much as the validation of marriage rights—and the entangled relationship between 
the two in the Court’s constitutional reasoning. Just as bans on interracial marriage 
were an essential part of the segregationist regime, eliminating them was an integral 
chapter in the series of civil rights decisions issued by the Warren Court. A central 
9. Bruce Ackerman, We the People, Volume 3: The Civil Rights Revolution 291 (2014) (examining 
how the civil rights movement, federal civil rights legislation, and Brown transformed the U.S. Constitution).
10. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1419, 1504 (1993) (“Loving 
v. Virginia, the principal case establishing the due process right to marry, also provides the best analogy 
for gaylaw’s view that the practice of excluding lesbian and gay couples from state-sanctioned marriage 
should be abruptly rather than gradually ended.”); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The 
“Fundamental Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893, 1951 (2004) (referring to 
same-sex marriage as Loving ’s “overdue companion ruling for gays and lesbians in America”). See 
generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case for Same-Sex Marriage 153–67 (1996); Loving v. 
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), reprinted in Same-Sex Marriage: Pro and Con 88–90 (Andrew Sullivan 
ed., 2004) (1997).
11. Mildred Loving, Loving for All, Freedom to Marry (June 12, 2007), http://www.freedomtomarry.
org/page/-/files/pdfs/mildred_loving-statement.pdf.
12. See generally infra notes 154–64.
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question in Loving was whether the Court would extend the holding in Brown from 
the realm of public education to state laws regulating marriage.13 By applying Brown’s 
prohibition of racial separation to the private sphere of marriage, formerly seen as the 
exclusive domain of states’ power, the Court radically confirmed a constitutional 
mandate for federal intervention in all aspects of the nation’s racial regime.
 Part III evaluates how federal courts have interpreted the civil rights dimension 
of Loving in the decades that followed. I argue that key U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
have perverted the central lesson of Loving. Rather than link racial classifications to 
political subordination (as the Loving Court did), subsequent Court opinions have 
wrongly relied on Loving to do just the opposite.14 Loving has been misused to 
support a colorblind approach to the Fourteenth Amendment that treats the 
government’s use of race to eliminate the contemporary vestiges of Jim Crow as 
contemptible as the Jim Crow classifications designed to enforce white rule. 
 Finally, Part IV explains why the lessons of Loving as a civil rights decision are 
especially important in today’s supposedly “post-racial” society. A new biopolitics of 
race is resuscitating the notion of biological racial classifications underlying the anti-
miscegenation laws that Loving struck down. Genomic science and gene-based 
biotechnologies are promoting race-consciousness at the molecular level at the very 
moment the Court and many policymakers believe race-consciousness is no longer 
necessary at the social level. I conclude that it is more urgent than ever to understand 
race as a political system that determines individuals’ status and welfare, and for 
federal courts to implement, uphold, and enforce strong race-conscious remedies for 
the lasting legacy of slavery that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to abolish 
and civil rights activists fought to eradicate.
i. thE LOVing LaWsUit in thE CiViL rights agEnda 
 On June 2, 1958, Richard Loving, a twenty-four-year-old white bricklayer, drove 
from Caroline County, Virginia with eighteen-year-old Mildred Jeter, his part-Negro, 
part-Cherokee childhood sweetheart, to wed in Washington, D.C. because they were 
barred by law from marrying in their home state.15 Many of the blacks and whites in 
the county had mixed ancestries that included Cherokee.16 Outside of officially 
segregated spaces, residents of different racial backgrounds “freely socialized, worked 
side by side (Richard’s father worked for a black landowner) and occasionally fell in 
love.”17 The Lovings returned to Virginia to live with Mildred’s parents as a married 
couple. Five weeks later, the newlyweds were awakened in their bedroom by the county 
sheriff and two deputies who arrested them for unlawful cohabitation. The Lovings’ 
13. See infra notes 67–73.
14. See infra notes 154–64.
15. Robert A. Pratt, The Case of Mr. and Mrs. Loving: Reflections on the Fortieth Anniversary of Loving v. 
Virginia, in Family Law Stories 7–8, 14 (Carol Sanger ed., 2008); see also Susan Dominus, The Color 
of Love, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 2008, at A21.
16. Dominus, supra note 15; Simeon Booker, The Couple That Rocked Courts, Ebony, Sept. 1967, at 78–80.
17. Dominus, supra note 15.
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marriage certificate, the sheriff said, was not recognized in the State of Virginia.18 The 
Lovings were indicted by a grand jury for trying to evade the ban on interracial 
marriage.19 They pleaded guilty and, on January 6, 1959, Judge Leon M. Bazile 
suspended their one-year sentence “on the condition that the [couple] leave the State 
and not return to Virginia together for [twenty-five] years.”20
 The Lovings’ lawsuit challenging their conviction must be placed in the context 
of the litigation agenda that helped implement the civil rights revolution. By the time 
the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) brought the case before the U.S. 
Supreme Court, state anti-miscegenation laws had long been challenged by the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and 
considered a potential target for the civil rights litigation campaign led by its Legal 
Defense and Education Fund. These laws were part of the Jim Crow segregationist 
apparatus, along with laws enforcing segregation in education, housing, employment, 
and public accommodations, and denying voting and other political rights.
 A. Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Segregationist Regime
 Laws banning interracial marriage were a key part of the segregationist edifice 
dismantled by the civil rights movement.21 Indeed, legal barriers to interracial intimacy 
were essential to establishing the political order that separated human beings into 
races, subordinated blacks to the rule of whites, and policed the boundaries between 
them.22 Legal regulation of sex and marriage hardened the lines between the racial 
categories that emerged in the U.S. colonies. The statutes the Lovings violated had a 
long pedigree in Virginia that originated in slavery.23 Virginia was the first colony to 
punish interracial sex when, in 1662, the legislature amended its prohibition of all 
fornication to impose heavier penalties if the guilty parties were “[N]egro[es]” and 
“Christian[s].”24 In 1691, the Virginia Assembly beefed up its laws against racial 
mixing by making it a crime for Negro, mulatto, and Indian men to marry or 
“accompany” a white woman.25 Just as significant as laws policing interracial sex was a 
18. Pratt, supra note 15, at 14.
19. Id. at 15; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
20. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3.
21. See generally Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 201–14; Peggy Pascoe, What Comes Naturally: 
Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America 246–84 (2009) (explaining the legal 
attacks on miscegenation laws from McLaughlin v. Florida to Loving v. Virginia). For a description of 
federal immigration, citizenship, and military laws and regulations that restricted interracial marriages 
in the decades before 1967, see Rose Cuison Villazor, The Other Loving: Uncovering the Federal 
Government’s Racial Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1361 (2011).
22. See Barbara K. Kopytoff & A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of 
Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 Geo. L.J. 1967, 1967–68 (1989).
23. Id. at 2020–21; Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 
1860s–1960s, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 371, 372 (1994).
24. Kopytoff & Higginbotham, supra note 22, at 1967, 1993–94.
25. Id. at 1995; Wallenstein, supra note 23, at 390.
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Virginia statute passed in 1662 that gave children born to black mothers and fathered 
by white men the status of slave.26 This law permitted slaveholders to profit from their 
sexual exploitation of enslaved women.27
 By shielding whites from marriage by all non-whites, Virginia aimed to preserve 
white racial purity; the 1691 statute left Negroes, mulattos, and Indians free to marry 
each other. Moreover, prior to the Civil War, the miscegenation laws punished only 
whites, both to protect slaveholders’ commercial investment in enslaved blacks and to 
compel whites to preserve the purity of their bloodlines.28 White people were held 
out as a privileged race that should protect itself from contamination by inferior 
races. Interracial marriage would “undermine the very basis of the caste order” by 
permitting non-whites to gain membership to the privileged caste, defined solely by 
its whiteness.29 Anti-miscegenation laws ensured that black men, women, and 
children would not benefit from the privileges of legal marriage to a white person. 
As W.J. Cash explained in The Mind of the South, whites passed these laws to protect 
“the right of their sons in the legitimate line, through all the generations to come, to 
be born to the great heritage of white men.”30 In America’s racial order, only white 
people were supposed to enjoy the valuable powers, privileges, and benefits conferred 
by white identity.31
 The anti-miscegenation laws at the time the Lovings were arrested were part of 
the Jim Crow legal regime that took hold after the Civil War and officially separated 
blacks from whites in every aspect of social life—from schools to hospitals, buses, 
restaurants, hotels, swimming pools, and drinking fountains. From 1874 to 1913, at 
least twelve states and territories passed legislation against interracial marriage.32 At 
26. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color: Race and the American Legal Process; 
The Colonial Period 42–45 (1978); see also Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2063, 
2082–83 (1993) (noting that the 1662 Virginia act entitled “Negro womens [sic] children to serve according 
to the condition of the mother” specified a mechanism for determining a person’s legal race).
27. Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of 
Liberty 22–33 (First Vintage Books 1999) (1997); see also Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race 
and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 221 (1999) (discussing tort, trusts and estates, and 
other legal doctrines that collaborated with rules of rape and reproduction in enslaved women’s sexual 
exploitation).
28. Kopytoff & Higginbotham, supra note 22, at 1968, 2000–01; Randall Kennedy, Interracial 
Intimacies: Sex Marriage, Identity, and Adoption 220 (2003); Reginald Oh, Regulating White 
Desire, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 463, 476–77 (2007).
29. Oh, supra note 28, at 474 (“To permit intermarriage would be to give the hybrid offspring the legal 
status of its father, and would soon undermine the very basis of the caste order.” (quoting Kingsley 
Davis, Intermarriage in Caste Societies, 43 Am. Anthropologist 376, 389 (1941))).
30. W.J. Cash, The Mind of the South 116 (1941); see also Davis, supra note 27, at 282–83 (“How wealth 
is transferred . . . proves significant in marking a group’s location in our culture.”).
31. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1709, 1726 (1993) (“White identity 
conferred tangible and economically valuable benefits and was jealously guarded as a valued possession, 
allowed only to those who met a strict standard of proof.”).
32. See Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 160 figs.7 & 8 (showing that thirty states had anti-miscegenation 
regimes in place by 1913, while at least eighteen states had anti-miscegenation regimes in place in 1874).
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the anti-miscegenation regime’s peak, from 1913 to 1948, thirty states prohibited 
sexual and marital relationships between blacks and whites.33 Some states also banned 
these relationships between Native Americans and whites, and Asians and whites.
 Segregating people according to race required stricter enforcement of the borders 
delimiting whiteness. The legal apparatus regulating marriage included both race-
based prohibitions and the racial classifications needed to implement them.34 The 
effort to legislate the superior political status of whites, and the inferior political 
status of non-whites, necessitated legal specifications for those categories.35 State 
laws banning interracial marriage had to stipulate a test for Negroes, Mongolians, 
Indians, and other racialized groups who were barred from marrying whites. In other 
words, the legal construction of racial categories was a means of implementing the 
white supremacist regime. Defining the Negro race as varying degrees of African 
ancestry was not determined by nature, but was necessitated by the state’s interest in 
banning interracial relationships and other forms of racial mixing ultimately aimed 
at upholding white domination.
 The statutes at issue in Loving were part of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, a 
“comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial 
marriages.”36 The act made it a crime for a “white person” to marry anyone other 
than another “white person,” defined as having “no trace whatever of any blood other 
than Caucasian,” and prevented officials from issuing marriage licenses until they 
were satisfied that the applicants’ statements as to their race were correct.37 The law 
also required local and state registrars to keep certificates of “racial composition” for 
everyone born in the state.38 Violations of the marriage ban were felonies punishable 
by one- to five-years imprisonment.39
 The Jim Crow regime emerged at the same time as eugenics was taking hold as 
mainstream science in the United States.40 American scientists embraced the theory 
33. Id. at 160 fig.8.
34. Pascoe, supra note 21, at 134.
35. Id.
36. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
37. Id. at 6–7.
Intermarriage prohibited; meaning of term “white persons.”—It shall hereafter be unlawful 
for any white person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a person with no 
other admixture of blood than white and American Indian. For the purpose of this 
chapter, the term “white person” shall apply only to such person as has no trace whatever 
of any blood other than Caucasian. . . .
 Id. at 5 n.4 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 20 -54 (1960 Repl. Vol.)).
38. See id. at 6–7. 
39. Id. at 4 (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 20-59 (1960 Repl. Vol.)) (“Punishment for marriage.—If any white 
person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall 
be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor 
more than five years.”).
40. See Gregory Michael Dorr, Segregation’s Science: Eugenics and Society in Virginia 3–4 (2008).
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that intelligence and other personality traits are genetically determined (and therefore 
inherited), and launched a campaign to remedy America’s social problems by 
stemming biological degeneracy.41 The eugenicists advocated the rational control of 
reproduction in order to improve the nation’s mental, moral, and physical health 
through selective breeding. In reality, eugenics enforced social judgments about race, 
class, and gender, cloaked in scientific terms.42 The scientific theory of genetic 
hierarchy supported the desire by white Anglo Saxons to maintain control over an 
exploited workforce of Southern black sharecroppers and urban factory workers from 
southern and eastern Europe. They were also obsessed with preventing “race suicide” 
and preserving their racial purity.
 Eugenicists saw two main problems with racial miscegenation. First, race mixing 
diluted the Anglo Saxon racial stock, which was seen to be the superior gene pool 
that should be expanded by positive eugenic programs. The Racial Integrity Act 
expressed eugenicists’ worry that mating between whites and anyone with any trace 
of Negro ancestry would deteriorate the white race. Second, eugenicists believed that 
people of different races were so distinct that if they mated, the genes coming from 
each parent would create abnormalities in their offspring. Whites and Negroes were 
at opposite ends of the racial classification scheme, so their mixing was supposed to 
cause the most havoc.
 On the same day in March 1924, the Virginia legislature enacted two laws that 
jointly promoted the state’s eugenicist and racist agendas.43 Virginia’s anti-
miscegenation law, the Racial Integrity Act, implemented the Jim Crow racial 
separation scheme by discouraging the reproductive intermingling of people who 
were believed to be naturally divided by race. The trial judge who sentenced the 
Lovings explained the law’s rationale:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay, and red, and he 
placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his 
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he 
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.44
 Of course, people of different races had been mixing in Virginia for centuries, as 
Thomas Jefferson’s sexual relationship with his slave Sally Hemings illustrates.45 Since 
the founding of the colony, Virginia officials saw a need to pass punitive laws in an 
effort to stem voluntary and coerced sexual intermingling that occurred across racial 
41. See Daniel J. Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity 
83–84 (First Harvard Univ. Press 1995) (1985).
42. See generally Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (1981) (explaining that social prejudice 
inf luences scientific research to produce results that conform to scientists’ prejudices).
43. Act of Mar. 20, 1924, ch. 371, 1924 Va. Acts 534 (preserving racial integrity); Act of Mar. 20, 1924, ch. 394, 
1924 Va. Acts 569 (providing for the sexual sterilization of inmates of state institutions in certain cases).
44. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967).
45. See Lerone Bennett, Jr., Miscegenation in America, Ebony, Oct. 1962, at 96. See generally Annette 
Gordon-Reed, Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings: An American Controversy 1 (1997).
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lines. Thus, the trial judge relied on an assumed natural order rooted in racist ideology 
to obscure the state’s imposition of a white supremacist order on human interactions.
 Along with the Racial Integrity Act, which the Lovings violated, lawmakers 
passed “An act to provide for the sexual sterilization of inmates of state institutions in 
certain cases,” authorizing the forced sterilization of people confined to government 
asylums because they were “feeble-minded.” This compulsory sterilization law was the 
subject of the 1927 case, Buck v. Bell, in which the Court, in an opinion by Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, upheld its constitutional validity.46
 Walter Ashby Plecker, Virginia’s first registrar of vital statistics, embodied the 
state’s dual racial integrity and eugenicist mission.47 His Bureau of Vital Statistics put 
in place the administrative procedures necessary to implement the state’s anti-
miscegenation laws. The administrative apparatus, composed of midwives and doctors 
who reported births, undertakers who reported deaths, and marriage license clerks, 
ensured that the racial identities of all Virginians were accurately recorded, and that 
the prohibition against intermarriage was strictly enforced.48 Eugenic science 
confirmed Plecker’s “greatest surprise and shock” at “the great amount of racial 
intermixture going on quietly and steadily” and steeled his resolve to protect the white 
race from the “terrible calamity” caused by births of mulatto children.49 Plecker 
corresponded with Harry Hamilton Laughlin, superintendent of the Eugenics Record 
Office and well-known lobbyist for the movement.50 Thus, eugenic science went hand 
in hand with Jim Crow restrictions on marriage, together implementing the white 
supremacist ideology of an innate racial hierarchy that called for racial separation.
 B.  Movement Priorities, Litigation Strategy, and the Assault on Anti-Miscegenation 
Laws
 Civil rights activists were well aware of the role anti-miscegenation laws played 
in supporting the racial order. In 1910, the renowned sociologist and civil rights 
leader W.E.B. DuBois wrote in The Independent, “I believe that all so-called ‘laws 
against intermarriage’ are simply wicked devices to make the seduction of women 
easy and without penalty, and should be forthwith repealed.”51 DuBois articulated 
one of the main arguments blacks made against these laws: They shielded white 
men’s sexual exploitation of black women.52 In its early years, branches of the 
NAACP waged a concerted assault to defeat anti-miscegenation laws in state 
46. 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
47. Dorr, supra note 40, at 137, 147–48; Pascoe, supra note 21, at 140–43.
48. Pascoe, supra note 21, at 143–45.
49. Id. at 140–41.
50. See generally Philip Reilly, The Virginia Racial Integrity Act Revisited: The Plecker-Laughlin Correspondence: 
1928–1930, 16 Am. J. Med. Genetics 483 (1983) (contextualizing and reporting the correspondence 
between Plecker and Laughlin from 1928–1930).
51. Pascoe, supra note 21, at 169.
52. Id. at 179.
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legislatures across the country.53 From 1913 to 1929, as these bills were introduced in 
the North, “[t]he NAACP met every attempt with firm resistance, mounting at least 
twenty-nine separate campaigns in northern state legislatures, and lobbying against 
fourteen proposals for laws designed to cover Washington, D.C.”54 In the early years 
of the civil rights movement, however, marriage restrictions were yet to become a 
priority on the civil rights litigation agenda.55
 Historian Peter Wallenstein’s account of correspondence between a local attorney 
and the NAACP suggests why the organization and its allies delayed making 
interracial marriage the focus of its campaign in the federal courts.56 In 1944, a 
federal judge in Oklahoma denied a black man, William Stevens, an inheritance 
from his deceased wife, Stella Sands, because she was a “full-blood Creek Indian.”57 
Under Oklahoma law, their marriage was void, and therefore did not revoke the will 
that Sands had created prior to their union. Stevens’s attorney, A.L. Emery, wrote a 
letter to NAACP Special Counsel Thurgood Marshall asking for help to appeal the 
decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.58 Marshall indicated that the 
NAACP had contemplated a challenge to state interracial marriage bans, replying 
that “this is most certainly the type of case we are vitally interested in and it will be 
a pleasure to serve with you.”59 But the organization’s enthusiasm for litigating the 
matter soon waned in the face of strategic considerations. Marshall and his colleagues 
feared that the strength of federal case law supporting state anti-miscegenation laws 
predicted “a great likelihood and danger of creating an unfavorable Appellate Court 
precedent.”60 The NAACP sent Emery financial contributions to support his 
advocacy for Stevens, but declined to launch its own legal challenge to Oklahoma’s 
statute. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court decision disinheriting Stevens 
on the basis of his race.61
 Shortly after the Court issued its 1954 decision in Brown, NAACP President 
Walter White told a reporter that the organization had “always opposed” anti-
miscegenation laws “on the basic ground that they do great harm to both races.”62 But 
the NAACP still refrained from mounting the type of aggressive litigation campaign 
to overturn the laws as it had in the areas of education, housing, employment, public 
53. Id. at 172–73.
54. Id. at 172.
55. Id. at 202–04; see also Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 201–02.
56. See Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 179. (“[E]xperience had led the NAACP lawyers to see that they 
‘must proceed with caution in that the case must not only be the right type of case, but it must also be 
brought at the right time.’”).
57. Stevens v. United States, 146 F.2d 120, 122, 124 (10th Cir. 1944).
58. See Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 175–76.
59. See id. at 176.
60. See id.
61. Stevens, 146 F.2d at 124.
62. Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 184.
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accommodation, and voting rights. Instead, it was the ACLU that persuaded the 
California Supreme Court in 1948 to strike down the California law in Perez v. Sharp, 
and challenged the Virginia statute in the U.S. Supreme Court.63
 Most civil rights activists at that time distinguished between political rights and 
less pressing rights, such as “social equality” involving personal relationships.64 On 
the one hand, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. condemned anti-miscegenation laws 
because “from the beginning [they] grew out of racism and the doctrine of white 
supremacy,” and he called the Loving decision “a real attack on racism.”65 On the 
other hand, King diminished their significance, observing, “In states where you have 
had that right all along there hasn’t been a large number of intermarriages.”66 
Morehouse College President Benjamin Mays echoed this observation in a letter, 
objecting to the claim that the NAACP’s attack on segregation would lead to 
intermarriage: “I don’t agree with you that the abolition of segregation means 
intermarriage. It has not meant this in Boston, New York and Chicago. In fact it has 
not meant this in over half of the nation where segregation by law does not exist.”67
 In a 1966 article supporting the constitutionality of anti-miscegenation laws, 
Alfred Avins wrote that Negroes at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted 
considered intermarriage less urgent because “[i]t was not treated like the right to vote 
or other rights which should be encouraged.”68 In the wake of the Civil War, white 
Americans also believed that granting emancipated African Americans limited forms 
of legal equality need not entail treating them as social equals.69 Their preference for 
granting blacks political rights over social rights persisted into the twentieth century. 
Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal discovered in his interviews of U.S. whites for his 
1944 classic, An American Dilemma, “that they overwhelmingly put their highest 
priority on maintaining ‘the bar against intermarriage and sexual intercourse involving 
63. Ackerman, supra note 9, at 293; Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
64. Pascoe, supra note 21, at 168; see also Renee C. Romano, Race Mixing: Black-White Marriage in 
Postwar America 177 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003).
65. Chester Higgins, Mixed Marriage Ruling Brings Mixed Reaction in Dixieland, Jet, June 29, 1967, at 24.
66. Id. at 25.
67. Alex Lubin, Romance and Rights: The Politics of Interracial Intimacy, 1945–1954, at 94 
n.46 (quoting Letter from Benjamin E. Mays to Garland B. Porter (Dec. 16, 1954) (on file with the 
Library of Congress)).
68. Alfred Avins, Anti-Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 52 Va. L. 
Rev. 1224, 1253 (1966).
69. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State 
Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1120 (1997); Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three 
Acts, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 1689, 1696 (2005). But see Steven G. Calabresi & Andrea Matthews, 
Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 1393, 1463 (2012) (“The Civil Rights Act of 
1866 gave African Americans the same right to enter into marriage contracts with white citizens as was 
enjoyed by white citizens.”). Calabresi and Matthews discuss two state supreme court decisions from the 
1870s that held that anti-miscegenation laws violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See id. at 1463–69.
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white women’” and were less resistant to extending opportunities to blacks in the 
public spheres of education, employment, and voting.70
 Civil rights advocates feared that pressing to overturn interracial marriage bans 
would jeopardize the gains made in desegregating public education. Peter Wallenstein 
explains, “Not only were other matters more urgent, but there seemed far greater 
likelihood of success in pursuing them, and a failed effort would be substantially 
worse than just leaving things alone.”71 The Court victories leading to Brown posed 
a barrier because Southerners viewed the erosion of segregated education as a path to 
interracial intimacy.72 Southerners interviewed by a Los Angeles Times reporter in 
1961 expressed their “deep-rooted fear” of interracial marriage as the source of their 
objection to integration.73 According to a New Orleans businessman, it was fine for 
blacks to use public accommodations, “[b]ut as soon as they start going to school 
with white children they’ll start breaking in socially. Kids don’t know any better. 
First thing you know they’ll be fooling around and then intermarrying and eventually 
you’ll have amalgamation of the races.”74 Roy Wilkins of the NAACP explained 
whites’ obsession with intermarriage as the result of “desperation” from civil rights 
gains: “The little world they have constructed for themselves that was so comfortable 
and unchallenged for so long (due largely to the illegal machinery they had built to 
delay or prevent its being challenged) is now crumbling about them. So they scream 
intermarriage.”75 Ironically, the subject of interracial intimacy was at once too trivial 
and too controversial to rise to the top of the civil rights agenda.
 Like the NAACP advocates, the justices of the Supreme Court delayed acting on 
state bans on interracial marriage for fear that a premature challenge might set back 
the momentum created by civil rights activism. An Alabama case involving the 
conviction of a black woman, Linnie Jackson, for marrying a white man arrived at the 
Court in 1954, shortly after the decision in Brown. In a November 3, 1954 memo, 
Harvey M. Grossman, law clerk to Justice William O. Douglas, advised that although 
“[i]t seems clear that the statute involved is unconstitutional,” the justices should 
consider postponing review “until the school segregation problem is solved” because 
“review at the present time would probably increase the tensions growing out of the 
70. Ackerman, supra note 9, at 292 n.4 (quoting Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma 60–61 (2d 
ed. 1962).
71. Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 179.
72. See Pascoe, supra note 21, at 202–03 (“The closer the NAACP came to eradicating the principle of 
separate but equal in education, the more southern intransigents defended race segregation in the 
schools as necessary in order to stave off interracial sex and marriage.”). Successful challenges to 
segregated education preceding Brown included Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), holding that 
admission of blacks to a separate law school at the University of Texas violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See generally McLaurin v. Okla. Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding 
unconstitutional the University of Oklahoma’s separate treatment of a black doctoral student).
73. Sherman, supra note 6.
74. Id. at 9.
75. Letter from Roy Wilkins to Benjamin E. Mays (Dec. 23, 1954) (on file with the Library of Congress).
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school segregation cases and perhaps impede solution to that problem.”76 Nevertheless, 
Douglas, along with Justice Hugo Black and Chief Justice Earl Warren, voted to hear 
Jackson v. Alabama. But a five-justice majority (Harold Burton, Thomas Clark, Felix 
Frankfurter, Sherman Minton, and Stanley Reed) cast the deciding votes to let Linnie 
Jackson’s conviction stand.77
 One year later, in Naim v. Naim, the justices continued to avoid the miscegenation 
issue when they declined to overturn a Virginia Supreme Court decision upholding 
the constitutionality of the 1924 Racial Integrity Act in a case challenging the race-
based annulment of the marriage between a Chinese man and white woman.78 Justice 
Frankfurter reiterated the worry that striking down state restrictions on interracial 
marriage would jeopardize implementation of the Court’s recent school desegregation 
rulings. He warned that deciding Naim would insert the topic of interracial marriage 
“into ‘the vortex of the present disquietude’ and ‘very seriously  .  .  . embarrass the 
carrying-out of the Court’s decree of last May,’” referring to Brown II ’s declaration 
that school desegregation would proceed with “all deliberate speed.”79 Instead, 
Frankfurter reminded his fellow brethren of “the Court’s responsibility in not 
thwarting or seriously handicapping the enforcement of its decision in the segregation 
cases.”80 Although the justices cast their handwringing over interracial marriage bans 
as prudent prioritizing, their delay in striking down these laws also reflected a timid 
reluctance to take such radical action against the Jim Crow regime at an early stage of 
the civil rights movement.81
 It would be a mistake, however, to see this postponement as disconnecting 
Loving from the civil rights movement. The conf licted sentiments of both the 
NAACP lawyers and the U.S. Supreme Court justices show that they viewed anti-
miscegenation laws as an odious part of the Jim Crow regime that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibited and the civil rights movement fought to abolish. When the 
Loving decision was issued, one of the Lovings’ attorneys, Bernard S. Cohen, 
declared: “We hope we have put to rest the last vestiges of racial discrimination that 
were supported by the law in Virginia and all over the country.”82 Similarly, Jet 
Magazine’s Washington Bureau Chief Simeon Booker wrote, “For generations, civil 
76. Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 180 (quoting Letter from Harvey M. Grossman, law clerk to William O. 
Douglas, Supreme Court Justice (Nov. 3, 1954) (on file with the Library of Congress)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 180–81; Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 749 (Va. 1955).
79. Ackerman, supra note 9, at 289, 294; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., II, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (issuing 
directives to district courts to implement the Court’s holding in Brown I).
80. Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 182; see also Pascoe, supra note 21, at 230 (“When Naim reached the 
U.S. Supreme Court, it caused even more distress among the justices than it had among civil rights 
organizations.”); Ackerman, supra note 9, at 289 (“Throughout the entire civil rights revolution, the 
president and Congress were completely unwilling to pass a federal statute banning state anti-
miscegenation laws.”).
81. See Richard Delgado, Naim v. Naim, 12 Nev. L.J. 525 (2012).
82. Helen Dewar, Victor in Mixed Marriage Case Relieved: “I Feel Free Now . . .”, Wash. Post, June 13, 1967, 
at A11.
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rights leaders conceded that until the complete framework of segregation was erased 
and that freedom extended into the sphere of marriage, the United States’ role as a 
democracy could be challenged. Few organizations, however, dared to contest ‘the 
bedroom aspect.’”83 The delay was a matter of strategic prioritizing, not a lack of 
concern about interracial marriage laws as a civil rights matter.
 Moreover, litigation and legislative challenges to state marriage restrictions 
proceeded outside the more visible federal court campaigns waged by the NAACP and 
ACLU. In the Perez decision, the Supreme Court of California held by a 4-3 majority 
that the state anti-miscegenation law was unconstitutional.84 Court-ordered 
reapportionment weakened conservative control in Southern border states, making 
laws restricting interracial marriage more vulnerable.85 By 1963, almost one-third of 
the thirty states that banned interracial marriage at the time of Perez had repealed their 
statutes.86 While between 1946 and 1956 only one state—California—invalidated its 
interracial marriage ban as unconstitutional, twelve states repealed their anti-
miscegenation laws between 1956 and 1966.87 The civil rights revolution had already 
reached restrictive marriage laws by the time Loving reached the high court. As Bruce 
Ackerman notes, moreover, the political transformation generated by landmark civil 
rights statutes passed by Congress in 1964 and 1965 opened the way for civil rights 
litigators to broach this “dangerous territory” in the U.S. Supreme Court.88
 Civil rights organizing also affected attitudes on interracial intimacy. Historian 
Renee C. Romano points to the growing interest in social equality among young civil 
rights activists in the 1960s who “envisioned a world where blacks and whites would 
relate to each other as brethren and social equals.”89 Their rejection of traditional 
racial and sexual norms and embrace of interracial organizing helped make anti-
miscegenation laws a higher priority.90 At the same time, the question of interracial 
marriage seemed less a trivial indicator of racial progress and more its supreme test. 
“Would you like to have your daughter marry a Negro?”—the “ultimate question” of 
race relations according to a 1966 New York Times article on Loving91—was seen by 
83. Simeon Booker, Kill Laws Against Mixed Marriages: Case of Virginia White Man with Negro Wife Led to 
Ruling, Jet, June 29, 1967, at 18.
84. Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 34 (Cal. 1948); R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation 
Law, and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 839, 848 (2008).
85. See Romano, supra note 64, at 190.
86. See Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 253–54 (explaining that nine of the thirty states with anti-
miscegenation laws after World War II no longer had miscegenation laws by 1963); see also Ackerman, 
supra note 9, at 296 (“[A] decline in the number of anti-miscegenation states from thirty in 1947 to 
seventeen in 1965.”).
87. M. Annella, Interracial Marriages in Washington, D.C., 36 J. Negro Educ. 428, 428 (1967).
88. Ackerman, supra note 9, at 289.
89. Romano, supra note 64, at 178.
90. Id.
91. Fred P. Graham, The Law: Miscegenation Nears Test in High Court, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1966, at 200; see 
also Sherman, supra note 6, at 2; St. Clair Drake & Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis: A Study 
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conservatives as a powerful rallying call for all white men, and by liberals as a gauge 
of racial bias.92 As Joseph Washington argued in Marriage in Black and White, 
published in 1970, “To the degree we come clean on marriage in black and white, 
everything else can be worked out, and to the degree we are dishonest about marriage 
in black and white, nothing else will work.”93 By the time lawyers for the Lovings 
announced they would test intermarriage bans before the high court, The New York 
Times criticized the significant delay in declaring the laws unconstitutional because 
they “strike deeper than ordinary segregation acts.”94
 In 1964, Yale Law School Dean Louis Pollak declared, “The time has come to 
remove this stigma from the fabric of American law.”95 Pollak was part of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund team that successfully defended a Miami Beach couple 
who were arrested in 1962 for violating a Florida statute that punished interracial 
couples who lived together without being married.96 In McLaughlin v. Florida, the 
U.S. Supreme Court overturned its 1883 holding in Pace v. Alabama to strike down 
Florida’s ban on interracial cohabitation for violating the Fourteenth Amendment.97 
The Court, however, explicitly declined to hold that its ruling applied to state bans 
on interracial marriage.98
 The Court’s narrow opinion reflected persistent caution in entering a controversial 
arena that Congress and the president had avoided.99 Moreover, as I discuss below, it 
was not clear at that juncture whether or not the states’ power to regulate marriage 
shielded anti-miscegenation laws from federal enforcement of the equal protection 
clause. Loving was a case of first impression. As Warren noted in Loving, “This case 
presents a constitutional question never addressed by this Court.” 
 Thus, though delayed for strategic reasons, the Loving lawsuit was part of the civil 
rights litigation agenda to help dismantle the segregationist regime. Civil rights 
advocates long recognized that laws banning interracial marriage were critical to the 
racial order’s ideological and institutional scaffolding. Indeed, the reluctance of the 
NAACP litigators and Supreme Court justices to confront anti-miscegenation stemmed 
of Negro Life in a Northern City 130 (Univ. Chi. Press 1993) (1970) (“The ultimate appeal for the 
maintenance of the color-line is always the simple, though usually irrelevant question, ‘Would you want 
your daughter to marry a Negro?’ To many white persons, this is the core of the entire race problem.”).
92. See Romano, supra note 64, at 196–99.
93. Id. at 199 (quoting Joseph Washington, Marriage in Black and White 1–2 (1970)).
94. Graham, supra note 91.
95. Pascoe, supra note 21, at 265 (quoting Anthony Lewis, Court Considers Race Marriages, N.Y. Times, 
Oct. 15, 1964, at 34).
96. Id. at 246–48. The petitioners, Connie Hoffman and Dewey McLaughlin, were in fact married, but 
failed to disclose this fact to the court because the jail sentence for interracial marriage was longer than 
that for cohabitation. Ackerman, supra note 9, at 296.
97. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188–92 (1964).
98. Id. at 196.
99. See Ackerman, supra note 9, at 300 (“McLaughlin was simply an artful effort to legitimate a cautious 
judicial advance into a sphere left untouched by the Civil Rights Act.”).
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largely from white Southerners’ deep aversion to interracial intimacy. The New York 
Times heralded the Court’s decision to hear the case as “set[ting] the stage for a historic 
ruling on the last vestige of ‘Jim Crow’ legislation to survive in the South.”100
ii. thE LOVing dECisiOn’s ChaLLEngE tO WhitE sUprEMaCY
 As we have seen, the assault on anti-miscegenation laws in the U.S. Supreme 
Court was a postponed yet integral part of the civil rights struggle and litigation 
agenda. Just as bans on interracial marriage were an essential part of the segregationist 
regime, eliminating them was an indispensable chapter in the series of civil rights 
decisions issued by the Warren Court. The Court’s decision in Loving extended the 
anti-separation holding in Brown, decided thirteen years earlier, from the public 
sphere of state-provided education to the private sphere of marriage. In striking 
down Virginia’s racial integrity law, the justices in Loving aimed to invalidate an 
instrument of white supremacy as much as to validate marriage rights—and the two 
missions were entangled in the Court’s opinion.
 A. “A Measure to Maintain White Supremacy”
 The State of Virginia argued that the Racial Integrity Act did not violate the 
equal protection clause because it treated all citizens equally; it prohibited both whites 
and non-whites from entering interracial marriages. According to Virginia, “because 
its miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro participants in 
an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial classifications do 
not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race.”101 The proper standard of 
scrutiny, therefore, was whether Virginia had shown a rational basis for its race-based 
prohibition. But the Court soundly dispensed with the equal application theory and 
refused to let the smokescreen of formal equality hide the subordinating reality of the 
statute’s blatant racial classification, noting that “the fact of equal application does not 
immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth 
Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.”102 
The Court therefore held that the statute should “be subjected to the ‘most rigid 
scrutiny’” and “must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some 
permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the 
object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.”103
 The contention between the Lovings and Virginia ultimately revolved not around 
the existence of a racial classification (the Racial Integrity Act meticulously 
categorized and regulated individuals by race) but on the purpose the classification 
scheme served. Virginia argued that the law’s racial classification served a legitimate 
state purpose. In upholding the trial court’s decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals 
100. Supreme Court Agrees to Rule on State Miscegenation Laws, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1966, at 40.
101. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967).
102. Id. at 9.
103. Id. at 11.
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of Virginia relied on the 1955 decision in Naim, which approved state efforts “‘to 
preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,’ and to prevent ‘the corruption of blood,’ ‘a 
mongrel breed of citizens,’ and the ‘obliteration of racial pride.’”104
 The U.S. Supreme Court, by contrast, could find no purpose for the law other 
than invidious racial discrimination. The Lovings’ attorney, Philip Hirschkop, 
argued before the Court, “[W]e fail to see how any reasonable man can but conclude 
that these laws are slavery laws [and] were incepted to keep the slaves in their 
place . . . and in truth, the Virginia law still views the Negro race as a slave race.”105 
The Court agreed, finding that the Racial Integrity Act originated as “an incident to 
slavery” and continued to be a “measure[] designed to maintain White Supremacy.”106 
Justice Black asked Virginia Assistant Attorney General R.D. McIlwaine III during 
oral argument,“[I]s there any doubt in your mind that the object of this statute, the 
basic premise on which [it rests], is that the white people are superiors of the colored 
people and should not be permitted to marry?”107 According to the Court’s reasoning, 
the Virginia law violated the equal protection clause not simply because it employed 
racial classifications, but because its racial classification system furthered the state’s 
impermissible white supremacist mission.108
 B. Extending Brown to Interracial Marriage
 The Lovings’ attorneys also treated Loving as a part of the civil rights campaign 
when they treated the case as an extension of Brown. A central question in Loving 
was whether the Court would apply its ruling against state-enforced segregation in 
Brown to state restrictions on interracial marriage. In upholding the Racial Integrity 
Act, the Virginia Supreme Court in Naim saw the need to distinguish state school 
segregation, at issue in Brown, from state restrictions on marriage. Justice Archibald 
Chapman Buchanan wrote that the benefits to citizenship achieved by integrated 
education did not pertain to interracial marriage, which would only “weaken or 
destroy the quality of its citizenship” through “the obliteration of racial pride” and 
“the corruption of blood.”109
104. Id. at 7 (quoting Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955)).
105. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), available at http://
www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1966/1966_395 (last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
106. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6, 11.
107. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 105, at 24.
108. See Adele M. Morrison, Same-Sex Loving: Subverting White Supremacy Through Same-Sex Marriage, 13 
Mich. J. Race & L. 177, 192–99 (2007) (distinguishing between Loving ’s freedom of choice, 
antidiscrimination, and antisubordination principles); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American 
Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. Miami L. Rev. 9, 10–12 (noting 
that Loving involved both anticlassification and antisubordination principles and arguing “that the 
scope of the two principles overlap, that their application shifts over time in response to social 
contestation and social struggle, and that antisubordination values have shaped the historical 
development of anticlassification understandings”).
109. Naim, 87 S.E.2d at 755–56.
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 The ACLU countered this distinction by arguing that laws banning interracial 
marriage were a more obvious violation of the Fourteenth Amendment than laws 
segregating schools.110 In its amicus brief, the NAACP Legal Defense and Education 
Fund echoed this comparison: “[L]aws against interracial marriage are among the 
last of such racial laws with any sort of claim to viability. But they are the weakest, 
not the strongest, of the segregation laws.”111 The Brown opinion relied on the 
inf luential 1944 study of race relations in America, An American Dilemma, by 
economist Gunnar Myrdal, for social scientific evidence of the injuries segregated 
education inf licted on black children.112 Likewise, the ACLU’s brief in Loving 
quoted An American Dilemma five times, suggesting that laws segregating schools 
and banning interracial marriage imposed a similar barrier to racial justice.113
 More fundamentally, laws prohibiting integrated schools and interracial marriage 
were related parts of the Jim Crow legal apparatus designed to police a strict racial 
hierarchy based on white racial purity and superiority. Indeed, a key reason for 
educating children in separate schools was to prevent interactions that might lead to 
interracial marriages.114 The Loving decision was an extension of Brown in the sense 
that both struck down anti-miscegenation laws that helped to maintain white 
supremacy.115
 In The Civil Rights Revolution, however, Ackerman observes that Chief Justice 
Warren prudently avoided “excessive reliance on Brown” because of lingering concern 
that invalidating anti-miscegenation laws would “inf lame southern resistance to 
school desegregation.”116 Warren quoted and cited Brown’s rejection of originalism to 
counter Virginia’s argument that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers did not 
intend the amendment to reach state laws banning interracial marriage.117 But he 
relied on two pre-civil rights decisions—Hirabayashi v. United States118 and Korematsu 
110. Brief for Appellants at 32, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 1967 WL 113927, at *32 
(“[M]iscegenation laws seem more clearly unconstitutional than school segregation . . . .”).
111. Brief of NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 14, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967) (No. 395), 1967 WL 113929, at *14; see also Hannah Arendt, Reflections on Little Rock, reprinted in 
Same-Sex Marriage: Pro & Con: A Reader 144, 145 (Andrew Sullivan ed., 2004) (1997) (arguing 
that the right to integrated education and political rights, such as the right to vote, are secondary to the 
right to marry).
112. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954).
113. Brief for Appellants, supra note 110, at *24–27.
114. Oh, supra note 6, at 1324, 1333.
115. Id. at 1333–34 (analyzing Loving and Brown jointly as “cases dealing with anti-miscegenation”).
116. Ackerman, supra note 9, at 285.
117. Id. at 301; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) (“As for the various statements directly 
concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, we have said in connection with a related problem, that although 
these historical sources ‘cast some light’ they are not sufficient to resolve the problem . . . .”) (citing Brown, 
347 U.S. 483).
118. 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (holding that President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s wartime executive orders subjecting 
individuals of Japanese descent to a curfew did not violate the Fifth Amendment).
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v. United States119—for the core holding that the equal protection clause requires that 
racial classifications be subjected to strict scrutiny.120 Ackerman writes, “Rather than 
basing his judgment squarely on school desegregation precedents, he reached back a 
quarter century to the Court’s decisions upholding the detention of Japanese 
Americans during World War II and made those into foundational precedents for 
Loving.”121 To Ackerman, this rhetorical gesture that enlisted wartime doctrine 
signaled that “the Court was not carrying on the civil rights revolution beyond the 
scope of concerns endorsed by We the People,” as reflected by congressional action.122 
 Ackerman argues further that the Loving opinion “shifted doctrinal attention away 
from Brown’s focus on the real-world humiliations” caused by Jim Crow segregation to 
“the suspect purposes” of state legislators in enacting racial classifications.123 According 
to Ackerman, the Court held in Brown that segregated education was unconstitutional 
based on the humiliation black children experienced every day by having to attend 
schools that were separate and inferior to those reserved for whites. In contrast, rather 
than describe how the Racial Integrity Act stigmatized interracial couples in everyday 
life, the Loving Court emphasized Virginia’s invidious interest in banning interracial 
marriage. Warren failed to mention Myrdal’s observations about white Americans’ 
aversion to interracial sex quoted in the Lovings’ brief and in Brown.124
 Ackerman therefore disagrees “that Loving deserves a central place in the civil 
rights canon.”125 With Loving, the Court merely filled the gap remaining at the end of 
the civil rights revolution when its prior decisions and federal statutes left state anti-
miscegenation laws standing—“a judicial mop-up operation.”126 Unlike its decisions 
that aligned with congressional action, Loving supplemented federal law by legalistically 
“entering a sphere that remained too hot for the political branches to handle.”127
 Ackerman’s analysis of Loving, however, does not disconnect the decision from the 
civil rights movement. Indeed, his analysis, like mine, places Loving squarely in its 
historical context at the end of the struggle to revolutionize the racial order in the 
United States. Ackerman attributes Loving to “We the Judges” rather than “We the 
People,” because it followed no landmark legislation invalidating state prohibitions of 
interracial marriage.128 Yet, despite Congress’s failure to touch “the bedroom aspect,” 
119. 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the constitutionality of President Roosevelt’s order excluding individuals 
of Japanese descent from certain areas, resulting in their confinement to internment camps).
120. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11.
121. Ackerman, supra note 9, at 290.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 291, 301 (“[Chief Justice Warren] swerved away from a strong reaffirmation of Brown’s anti-
humiliation principle.”).
124. See id. at 301–02.
125. Id. at 291.
126. Id. at 321.
127. Id. at 296.
128. Id. at 317, 321–22.
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civil rights activists had overturned or defeated anti-miscegenation laws in most state 
legislatures over the prior five decades.129 Moreover, the Court timed and framed its 
decision in Loving differently than its decision in Brown precisely for strategic reasons 
deeply entangled with the civil rights revolution taking place in the courts, in Congress, 
in the White House, and in the streets. In this sense, Loving is most definitely a civil 
rights decision.
 What about Loving’s place in the civil rights canon? Ackerman finds Loving’s 
legacy tarnished further because Warren swerved away from the anti-humiliation 
principle that animated Brown. Although the Court did not highlight the everyday 
indignities inflicted on interracial couples, it recognized that the political purpose 
behind interracial marriage laws was to help maintain the white supremacist regime. 
The equal protection doctrine should attend to the “law’s powerful capacity to 
stigmatize vulnerable groups in social life.”130 Yet, the anti-miscegenation apparatus 
erected in Virginia buttressed the racial order in fundamental ways that encompassed, 
and even surpassed, its impact on the everyday lives of interracial couples alone. Bans 
on interracial marriage not only stigmatized this aspect of social life, but they 
reinforced the ideology and practice of racial separation that undergirded the entire 
Jim Crow regime and systematically dehumanized all black people. The Court’s 
identification of their purpose to uphold white supremacy reinforced rather than 
diluted Brown’s condemnation of racial separation in education.131
 C. Federal Intervention in the Private Sphere of Marriage
 By extending Brown’s prohibition of racial separation to the private sphere of 
marriage, formerly seen as the exclusive domain of states’ power, the Court radically 
confirmed a constitutional mandate for federal intervention in all aspects of the 
South’s racial regime. In one sense, the Court extended the power of the equal 
protection clause to eliminate state discrimination in the realm of domestic 
relations.132 But by applying strict scrutiny to the Virginia statute, the Court also 
opened state marriage laws more broadly to federal oversight for the first time. Prior 
to Loving, the Court had never once struck down a state marriage statute.133 The 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 53–54, 86–87.
130. See Ackerman, supra note 9, at 304.
131. Ackerman recognizes a broad interpretation of Loving that “uses Warren’s condemnation of laws 
‘designed to maintain White Supremacy’ as a springboard for reviving an approach to equal protection 
that emphasizes the real-world dynamics of stigmatization.” Ackerman, supra note 9, at 306. Thus, it is 
possible to reconcile Brown and Loving without disputing Ackerman’s assessment of Brown as “the 
greatest judicial opinion of the twentieth century.” See Ackerman, supra note 9, at 317.
132. Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor, Introduction to Loving v. Virginia in a Post-Racial 
World: Rethinking Race, Sex, and Marriage 4 (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor 
eds., 2012) (“If Brown dismantled systems of racial supremacy at the institutional and public level, 
Loving enables a transformation at the most domestic and private.”).
133. Gregory & Grossman, supra note 7, at 20 (“[P]rior to Loving, the Supreme Court had invalidated not a 
single state marriage or divorce law, despite significant variations among state codes, and had often 
made clear its belief that marriage was a matter for the states to regulate.”).
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prevailing precedent was the Court’s decision in Maynard v. Hill to defer to state 
domestic relations norms because “[m]arriage  .  .  . has always been subject to the 
control of the legislature.”134
 From the vantage point of contemporary constitutional law, Loving seems split in 
two parts. One part, based on the equal protection clause, struck down anti-
miscegenation laws as a form of state racial discrimination. The other, based on the 
due process clause, protected the right to marry the partner of one’s choice. The 
Fourteenth Amendment clauses are now treated as distinct sources for applying strict 
scrutiny.135 However, the jurisprudence that supports a separate due process analysis 
of state intrusion in private family decisions developed largely after Loving in cases 
such as Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972),136 Roe v. Wade (1973),137 and Lawrence v. Texas 
(2003).138 Loving paved the way for federal courts to scrutinize state marriage laws 
for their compliance with substantive due process; the Loving Court did not have this 
body of constitutional family law to rely on.139 As John DeWitt Gregory and Joanna 
L. Grossman note: “There was no federal law norm about the right approach to 
regulating marriage and divorce before Loving, and thus no substantive principles for 
the Supreme Court to bring to bear on the few family law cases it heard.”140 Instead, 
the Court’s application of the equal protection and due process clauses to Virginia’s 
anti-miscegenation law worked together.141
 More important, the equal protection and due process clauses “operated in 
tandem”142 in Loving because the Racial Integrity Act’s restriction of marriage 
134. 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (upholding an order by the Supreme Court of the Territory of Washington 
that validated a legislative divorce).
135. Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1447, 1448 (2004) (“Today, most 
courts and scholars see the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses as discrete bases for strict 
scrutiny.”) (footnote omitted).
136. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives 
to unmarried individuals violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
137. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a Texas statute prohibiting abortions at any stage of pregnancy except 
to save the life of the mother violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
138. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a Texas statute prohibiting sodomy between people of the same sex 
was unconstitutional and that the intimate, adult consensual conduct at issue here was part of the liberty 
protected by the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause).
139. See Gregory & Grossman, supra note 7, at 33–34 (“[The] repudiation of unlimited state power over 
domestic relations . . . spurred an expansion of substantive due process rights more generally.”); id. at 34 
(“Prior to Loving, there were only a handful of cases  .  .  . in which the Supreme Court considered 
overriding a state law regarding family status or operation based on constitutional constraints.”); see also 
Lynn D. Wardle, Loving v. Virginia and the Constitutional Right to Marry, 1790–1990, 41 How. L.J. 289 
(1998) (discussing Loving’s importance to the evolution of a constitutional right to marry).
140. Gregory & Grossman, supra note 7, at 20. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), protecting the 
right of married couples to use contraceptives, had been decided only two years earlier.
141. Karlan, supra note 135, at 1448 (“Today, most courts and scholars see the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses as discrete bases for strict scrutiny. But in Loving, the two clauses operated in tandem.”).
142. Id.; see also Ackerman, supra note 9, at 306 (noting that Warren’s approach broke down the “doctrinal 
barriers separating equal protection from due process”).
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operated in tandem with the state’s racial classification system. It was the combined 
force of the invidiousness of the racial classification and the vital importance of 
marriage that violated the Fourteenth Amendment.143 Warren’s reasoning merges 
both aspects of the anti-miscegenation law:
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial 
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive 
of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is 
surely to deprive all the State’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.144
 In hindsight, Loving’s failure to explicitly recognize in the due process clause a 
separate, fundamental right to marry seems a grave limitation. Robin Lenhardt, for 
example, argues that the Perez decision is superior to Loving because “Justice Taynor 
refused to treat Perez as a case about race alone, insisting that it also concerned the 
right to marry ‘the person of one’s choice.’”145 Perez, she writes, “helps expose the 
limitations of the Court’s decision in Loving,” which, in declining clearly to articulate a 
fundamental right to marry, “fails to capture the true meaning of modern marriage.”146
 Although failing to set forth a separate basis for family liberty, the Court’s 
opinion in Loving acknowledges the nature of institutionalized racism often missed 
in contemporary theories of the individual’s right to choose. The Racial Integrity 
Act enforced a racial caste system by regulating marriage. Its restrictions on 
individual marital decisions not only denied autonomous choices, but also 
subordinated and dehumanized entire groups of people.
 The Court’s due process analysis relied mainly on Skinner v. Oklahoma, the 1944 
decision striking down the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which 
imposed involuntary sterilization for persons convicted three times for a felony 
involving moral turpitude.147 The statute made an exception for embezzlement and 
political offenses, but permitted sterilization of chicken thieves. As in Loving, the 
Skinner Court treated equal protection and due process as inextricably coupled. The 
Loving Court borrowed directly from Skinner in finding that the freedom to marry 
143. See Gregory & Grossman, supra note 7, at 23.
144. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
145. Robin A. Lenhardt, Perez v. Sharp and the Limits of Loving, in Loving v. Virginia in a Post-Racial 
World: Rethinking Race, Sex, and Marriage 73, 76–77 (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison 
Villazor eds., 2012).
146. Id. at 80, 83. Chief Justice Warren, the author of the Loving opinion, was governor of California when 
the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Perez. See generally I. Bennett Capers, The Crime of 
Loving: Loving, Lawrence, and Beyond, in Loving v. Virginia in a Post-Racial World: Rethinking 
Race, Sex, and Marriage 114, 117 (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2012). 
Warren had a traditional view of marriage and limited Loving’s discussion of the right to marry to 
accommodate the other justices. Rachel F. Moran, Beyond the Loving Analogy: The Independent Logic of 
Same-Sex Marriage, in Loving v. Virginia in a Post-Racial World: Rethinking Race, Sex, and 
Marriage 242, 245 (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2012); see also Ackerman, 
supra note 9, at 305 (discussing Warren’s efforts to appease Justice Hugo Black, who opposed 
reinvigorating substantive due process).
147. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
197
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 59 | 2014/15
deserved constitutional protection because “[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights 
of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”148 Skinner was particularly 
apt because it, too, recognized the danger of racist state standards for family 
decisionmaking: “In evil or reckless hands [the state’s power to sterilize] can cause 
races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.”149
 Indeed, by highlighting the way Virginia institutionalized white supremacy in its 
regulation of families, the Loving decision helps to dispel the false dichotomy 
between public and private domains. Feminist scholars have shattered the mythical 
separation of public and private spheres that justified women’s exclusion from the 
market, sheltered domestic violence from public scrutiny, and disqualified women’s 
needs from public support.150 The Court bridged this divide when it rejected 
Virginia’s argument that the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to anti-
miscegenation laws because its framers viewed marriage as a contract or social right 
rather than a political or civil right.151
 A false split between public and private spheres appears in the history of Loving as 
well as scholarship interpreting it. One reason for the delay in aggressively challenging 
interracial marriage bans was the view that state restrictions on interpersonal 
relationships were less important than state restrictions on public rights. Treating 
interracial marriage as a private matter that affected only a tiny minority of African 
Americans also made its prohibition seem less significant and urgent. In 1963, 
Howard University President James M. Nabrit, Jr. explained, “My own personal view 
is that interracial marriages are constitutionally protected, but they affect such small 
numbers of people that their consideration might very well be postponed at this 
critical time in the lives of our citizens.”152 A. Philip Randolph, president of the 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, similarly declared, “‘I’m neither for nor against 
148. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
149. 316 U.S. at 541.
150. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, Dependency and Social Debt, in Poverty and Inequality 
133, 139 (David B. Grusky & Ravi Kanbur eds., 2006) (“[T]he failure to adequately provide for its 
members can move a family from the private to the public sphere, where it may be regulated and 
disciplined.”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 8 Signs 635, 656–57 (1983) (“Privacy is everything women as women have never been 
allowed to be or to have; at the same time the private is everything women have been equated with and 
defined in terms of men’s ability to have.”); Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology 
and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497, 1501 (1983) (explaining that transcending the market-family 
dichotomy is critical to improving the lives of all individuals).
151. Loving, 388 U.S. at 9–10 (“The State argues that statements in the Thirty-ninth Congress about the 
time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate that the Framers did not intend the 
Amendment to make unconstitutional state miscegenation laws. . . . We have rejected the proposition 
that the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress or in the state legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth 
Amendment supported the theory advanced by the State . . . .”); see Brief and Appendix ex rel. Appellee 
at 19, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 1967 WL 113931, at *19 (“[Marriage] is not a 
civil right.  .  .  . Marriage is a contract between individuals competent to contract it.  .  .  . It is a social 
right. I understand that a civil right is a right that a party is entitled to and that he can enforce by 
operation of law.”).
152. Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 185.
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interracial marriages. It’s a personal relations question.”153 Like many of his peers, 
Nabrit considered the ongoing legal fight against discrimination in more public arenas 
such as education, employment, and voting “too critical for a diversion of scarce legal 
talent into . . . the relatively minor area of interracial marriage.”154
 Some legal scholars distinguish between civil rights decisions, such as Brown, 
which struck down official discrimination in the public sphere, and Loving, which 
“protects individuals from arbitrary governmental intrusions upon their intimate 
lives.”155 But, as Part I showed, the regulation of marriage was part and parcel of the 
government system of racial separation, establishing the very racial classifications 
needed to operate the Jim Crow regime. Loving’s great contribution to the civil rights 
struggle was abolishing this official scaffolding of white domination. Loving did 
“protect[] the ability of interracial couples to marry,”156 but this was tied to its 
monumental blow to the segregationist apparatus that affected the status of all people 
based on race, regardless of their marital decisions.
 Moreover, the Racial Integrity Act and the Court’s opinion invalidating it show 
that the family operates not only as a set of private relationships created by the 
choices of its individual members. The family serves an institutional role that can 
both promote and resist state interests and societal hierarchies.157 Virginia’s restriction 
of interracial marriage used family regulation to promote the state’s interest in 
maintaining a political system of white supremacy and a racist ideology about human 
equality. State surveillance of African American families has played a crucial role in 
racial subordination by disrupting kin and community ties that are important to self-
determination, and by portraying black people as incapable of forming loving and 
responsible family bonds.158 Denying enslaved Africans, newly emancipated freedmen, 
and women the right to marry excluded them from full citizenship.159
153. Higgins, supra note 65, at 25.
154. Wallenstein, supra note 3, at 185.
155. Maillard & Villazor, supra note 132, at 2.
156. Renee M. Landers, What’s Loving Got to Do with It? Law Shaping Experience and Experience Shaping 
Law, in Loving v. Virginia in a Post-Racial World: Rethinking Race, Sex, and Marriage 
128, 137 (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2012).
157. See generally Hayward Derrick Horton et al., Rural-Urban Differences in Black Family Structure: An 
Analysis of the 1990 Census, 16 J. Fam. Issues 298, 299–300 (1995) (explaining the black family’s 
relationship to societal hierarchies); Linda C. McClain, The Place of Families: Fostering 
Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility 3–4 (2006) (arguing that governments have an interest in 
“producing persons capable of responsible personal and democratic self-government”).
158. See generally Roberts, supra note 27 (explaining that racism as opposed to black procreation creates 
racial inequality); Dorothy Roberts, Shattered Bonds: The Color of Child Welfare (2002) 
(arguing for the transformation of a child welfare system that systematically demolishes black families).
159. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Marriage as a “Badge and Incident” of Democratic Freedom, in Marriage 
Proposals: Questioning a Legal Status 171 (Anita Bernstein ed., 2006) (“In the cauldron of [the] 
antislavery struggle, these acts of resistance, and the forced separations, restrictions on time and mobility, 
coerced partnerings, and retaliatory violence by which they were often punished or frustrated, combined to 
produce an understanding of family rights as essential to democratic citizenship and human freedom.”); see 
also Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African American Marriages, 
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 The impact of anti-miscegenation laws on individuals in interracial relationships 
was cruel and dehumanizing. According to Robert Pratt, the Lovings contacted 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy because they wanted to return to their home in 
Virginia and “had not really been that interested in the civil rights movement.”160 
Mildred avoided celebrating the couple’s contribution to the cause and saw herself “as 
an ordinary black woman who fell in love with an ordinary white man, and had they 
been allowed to marry without the state’s interference, that would have been the end 
of it.”161 Bernard S. Cohen reported at the end of oral argument that Richard Loving’s 
instructions to him were simply to “tell the Court I love my wife.”162 The Loving 
decision allowed thousands of interracial couples to live at home without fear of 
official sanction and thousands more to gain the privileges of marriage they had 
been denied on account of race.163
 But it would distort civil rights history and politics to view the Movement’s goal 
as increasing racial intermarriage. Some scholars treat interracial relationships 
themselves as a positive social good. In their view, these private crossings of racial 
lines show that racism is waning, offer sites where individuals can overcome racial 
prejudices and discover their common humanity, and constitute a powerful symbol of 
the potential for racial harmony.164 Randall Kennedy, for example, observes that “[f]ew 
situations are more likely to mobilize the racially privileged individual to move 
against racial wrongs than witnessing such wrongs inflicted upon one’s mother-in-
law, father-in-law, spouse, or child.”165 Because of its benefits for racial equality, he 
concludes, black-white intermarriage “is a mode of partnership that should be 
applauded and encouraged.”166
11 Yale J.L. & Human. 251, 252 (1999) (“[T]he institution of marriage was viewed as one of the primary 
instruments by which citizenship was both developed and managed in African Americans.”).
160. Pratt, supra note 15, at 16; Gregory & Grossman, supra note 7, at 24; Virginia Ban on Interracial 
Marriages Goes to Federal Court This Week, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1965, at 43 (noting that “the Lovings are 
not civil rights marchers ‘or even pioneers,’” and quoting Mrs. Loving as stating, “All we want to do is 
go back to Virginia, build a home, and raise our children”).
161. Gregory & Grossman, supra note 7, at 24 (quoting The Crime of Being Married, LIFE, Mar. 18, 1966, at 85).
162. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 105, at 9.
163. Capers, supra note 146, at 137 (“Loving has succeeded in protecting the ability of interracial couples to 
marry and form families, even if social and isolated pockets of official disapproval remain.”).
164. See Kennedy, supra note 28, at 109. (“One camp views [interracial marriage] as a positive good that 
decreases social segregation; encourages racial open-mindedness; increases blacks’ access to enriching 
social networks; elevates their status; and empowers black women in their interactions with black 
men.”); see also Rachel Moran, Interracial Intimacy 191 (2001) (“New patterns of intimacy are 
redefining the way that Americans think about race . . . .”). See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig, 
According to Our Hearts: rhinelander v. rhinelander and the Law of the Multiracial 
Family 278 (2013) (“[M]ultiracial families destabilize rigid categories of race in our society . . . .”).
165. Randall Kennedy, How Are We Doing with Loving?: Race, Law, and Intermarriage, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 815, 
819 (1997).
166. Id.; see also Ralph Richard Banks, Is Marriage for White People? How the African American 
Marriage Decline Affects Everyone 181 (2012) (arguing that black women would benefit 
themselves and their racial group if they increased their marriages across racial lines).
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 These scholars also point to the rate of intermarriage as an indicator of Loving’s 
impact.167 The number of interracial marriages has steadily increased since Loving, 
growing ten times since 1960.168 Yet interracial marriage remains relatively rare. 
Nearly half of all Americans report that they have dated someone of a different race 
or ethnicity, but they are far less likely to marry across racial lines.169 Black-white 
marriages are the least common—they constitute approximately four percent of all 
marriages.170 While conservatives parade rising intermarriage rates as proof of 
America’s colorblindness,171 others view the tiny percentage of marriages crossing 
racial lines as proof of Loving’s failure. The low rates of black-white intermarriage, 
writes Randall Kennedy, are “an impediment to the development of attitudes and 
connections that will be necessary to improve the position of black Americans and, 
beyond that, to address the racial divisions that continue to hobble our nation.”172
167. See Kennedy, supra note 165, at 818 (“[T]he pace of increase in marriage across the black-white racial 
frontier is quickening, especially in terms of white men and black women.”); Landers, supra note 156, at 
131, 135 (“[T]he removal of prohibitions on interracial marriage has not produced a mixed-race society 
where race has become irrelevant.”); Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Jacob Willig-Onwuachi, Finding a 
Loving Home, in Loving v. Virginia in a Post-Racial World: Rethinking Race, Sex, and 
Marriage 181 (Kevin Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2012) (“More than forty years 
after Loving, 95 percent of all individuals marry a person of the same race.”).
168. Statistics on interracial marriage during the 1960s are not entirely accurate because some states did not 
collect racial data on marriage, but the National Center for Health Statistics listed the rate of interracial 
marriages at 1.44 percent during the period from 1963 to 1966 in unpublished materials based on data 
from thirty-five states. Thomas P. Monahan, An Overview of Statistics on Interracial Marriage in the 
United States, with Data on Its Extent from 1963–1970, 38 J. Marriage & Fam. 223, 225 (1976). In 
2012, the Pew Research Center found that about 15 percent of all new marriages in the United States in 
2010 were interracial. Wendy Wang, The Rise of Intermarriage 1 (2012), available at http://www.
pewsocialtrends.org/2012/02/16/the-rise-of-intermarriage/.
169. Compare Jeffrey M. Jones, Most Americans Approve of Interracial Dating, Gallup (Oct. 7, 2005), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/19033/Most-Americans-Approve-Interracial-Dating.aspx (reporting that 48 
percent of Americans have dated someone from a different racial or ethnic background), with Wang, 
supra note 168, at 5 (reporting that 15.1 percent of all new marriages in the United States in 2010 were 
interracial).
170. Zhenchao Qian & Daniel T. Lichter, Changing Patterns of Interracial Marriage in a Multiracial Society, 
73 J. Marriage & Fam. 1065, 1076 (2011) (reporting the odds ratio of intermarriage between blacks 
and whites as 4.5 percent). Other evidence of the lagging social acceptance of interracial marriage is the 
reluctance of Southern states to repeal interracial marriage bans after Loving. Alabama became the last 
state to repeal its prohibition of intermarriage based in its state constitution in 2000. Even then, 40 
percent of the citizens of Alabama voted to retain the law. See General Election Results from Nov. 7, 2000, 
Ala. Sec’y State, http://www.sos.state.al.us/downloads/election/2000/general/2000g-amend.xls (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2015); see also Kennedy, supra note 28, at 279–80. The same was true in 1998 when 
South Carolina repealed its constitutional provision. See Interracial Marriage Ban Up for Vote in Alabama, 
N.Y. Times, June 3, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/03/us/national-news-briefs-
interracial-marriage-ban-up-for-vote-in-alabama.html (discussing South Carolina’s removal of its ban 
on intermarriage from their state Constitution in November 1988).
171. See Romano, supra note 64, at 291–93 (“Here rising intermarriage rates become proof that America has 
overcome its history of racist exclusions, even though the black-white marriage rate lags behind that of 
other types of interracial marriage.”).
172. Kennedy, supra note 165, at 819.
201
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 59 | 2014/15
 For some civil rights activists, the political was personal. Entering into interracial 
relationships was a natural extension of their struggle to create a society where people 
could relate as equal human beings regardless of race.173 Casey Hayden, a white staffer 
in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, explained, “Our struggle was to 
break down the system, the walls, of segregation. This implied no barriers in our 
relations with each other.”174 Marrying across racial lines can ref lect a mutual 
commitment to contest racial privilege, stereotypes, and ideologies and can lead to 
greater understanding of people’s racialized experiences and common humanity.175
 I disagree, however, with the view that interracial marriage—the choice of 
individuals to marry someone of another race—is a means or proof of liberation from 
white supremacy. Although the struggle against white supremacy has expanded 
possibilities for interracial intimacy, both within social movements and in the broader 
society, people in these relationships do not necessarily strive to dismantle racial 
hierarchies or even have liberating ideas about race. As The New York Times columnist 
Charles Blow observed, “You can like and even admire a person of another race 
while simultaneously disparaging the race as a whole. One can even be attracted to 
persons of different races and still harbor racial animus toward their group.”176 The 
potential for interracial marriage to be transformative as well as transgressive depends 
on the partners’ willingness to challenge the privileges of having a white identity and 
being married to a white person.177 Sociologist France Winddance Twine studies 
how some white partners and parents in transracial families learn to develop a critical 
analysis of racism and their own privileged identities—what she calls “racial literacy.” 
While focusing on these enlightened whites, however, she does not treat being 
involved in an interracial relationship as automatically leading to racial enlightenment. 
173. Romano, supra note 64, at 184.
174. Id.
175. See Maria P.P. Root, Love’s Revolution: Interracial Marriage 3 (2001) (“Although not intended 
as a political tool, each interracial marriage helps to change long-held assumptions and social 
conventions.”).
176. Charles M. Blow, Disrespect, Race and Obama, N.Y. Times (Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/11/16/opinion/blow-disrespect-race-and-obama.html?. Blow was responding in part to Richard 
Cohen’s statement in the Washington Post that “[p]eople with conventional views must repress a gag reflex 
when considering the mayor-elect of New York—a white man married to a black woman and with two 
biracial children.” See Richard Cohen, Christie’s Tea-Party Problem, Wash. Post (Nov. 11, 2013), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/richard-cohen-christies-tea-party-problem/2013/11/11/a1ffaa9c-
4b05-11e3-ac54-aa84301ced81_story.html.
177. See France Winddance Twine, A White Side of Black Britain: Interracial Intimacy and 
Racial Literacy (2010) (describing how some white partners and parents in interracial relationships 
develop racial literacy); Amy Steinbugler, Beyond Loving: Intimate Racework in Lesbian, Gay, 
and Straight Interracial Relationships (2012) (examining the racial dynamics of everyday life 
for lesbian, gay, and heterosexual black-white couples and their process of negotiating racial differences); 
Camille Gear Rich, Making the Modern Family: Interracial Intimacy and the Production of Whiteness, 127 
Harv. L. Rev. 1341, 1346 (2014) (reviewing Angela Onwuachi-Willig, According to Our 
Hearts: rhinelander v. rhinelander and the Law of the Multicultural Family (2013) (noting 
that interracial families can also be invested in cultivating and maintaining white identities).
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 Bennett Capers, a black law professor at Hofstra University whose husband is 
white, writes that his interracial marriage has decreased the prejudice he encounters 
against both his gay and black identities. Being partnered with a white man marks 
him as safe: “It is telling people I have a white partner that has served me well, that 
has made me acceptable. Palatable.”178 Still, Capers does not claim that his interracial 
relationship has diminished white people’s superior status or devaluation of black 
people. To the contrary, the benefits he accrues from having a white husband stem 
from white privilege.179
 Moreover, there is no evidence that interracial intimacy has the power to make 
the institutional changes necessary to achieve racial equality. Indeed, the long history 
of racial intermixing in the United States that coexisted with enslavement and 
disenfranchisement of blacks shows just the opposite. It could be argued that the 
abolition of de jure segregation, including Loving’s invalidation of anti-miscegenation 
laws, dramatically increased the chances for interracial relationships to achieve their 
liberating potential. Yet, as the marriage statistics show, persistent political, social, 
and economic gaps between whites and blacks pose barriers to any significant trend 
toward crossing racial lines to marry. Rather, institutionalized racism, as well as 
other social hierarchies which create these inequities, must be eradicated to allow 
people to relate to each other fully as equal human beings.180
 The civil rights dimension of Loving is just as relevant to arguments for same-sex 
marriage, as is the right to marry a partner of one’s choice. Indeed, attending to 
Loving’s civil rights lesson is more true to the distinctive histories of the black and 
gay liberation movements. Using Loving as a freedom of choice analogy has stretched 
the Loving opinion beyond the scope of its discussion of marriage and its roots in 
civil rights struggle.181 Moreover, extracting a right to marry from Loving, 
disconnected from its civil rights rationale, privileges marriage itself as the goal of 
the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ ) rights movement.
 Seeing Loving as a civil rights decision ties state-imposed marriage restrictions to 
the preservation of unjust hierarchies of power.182 From this vantage point, bans on 
same-sex marriage are unconstitutional because they perpetuate the distinct history 
178. Capers, supra note 146, at 127.
179. Id. at 126–27; see also Morrison, supra note 108, at 208–12 (discussing the impact of interracial marriage 
on the social status of black and white partners).
180. Romano, supra note 64, at 295 (“Old hierarchies must be dismantled for new attitudes about interracial 
love and marriage to f lourish.”).
181. See Moran, supra note 146, at 244–50; Julie Novkov, The Miscegenation/Same-Sex Marriage Analogy: What 
Can We Learn from Legal History?, 33 Law & Soc. Inquiry 345, 346–47 (2008) (“The analogy is 
imperfect, as bans on interracial marriages were initially generated as a conscious strategy to embed and 
articulate white supremacy, while the rules referring to marriage as a relationship between a man and a 
woman grew out of a background context of heteronormativity.”); Catherine Smith, Queer as Black Folk?, 
2007 Wis. L. Rev. 379, 385–94 (2007) (explaining the appeal and inaccuracy of sameness arguments).
182. See Morrison, supra note 108 (arguing that same-sex marriage is a civil rights issue because it works against 
heterosupremacy and white supremacy). But see Ackerman, supra note 9, at 307–08 (arguing that Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s opinion in United States v. Windsor declaring the federal Defense of Marriage Act 
unconstitutional relied on Brown rather than Loving by reviving Brown’s anti-humiliation principle).
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of the exclusion of gays and lesbians from equal citizenship. We can oppose the 
prohibition of same-sex marriage without believing that marriage is essential to 
LGBTQ liberation.183 Just as the objective of civil rights advocates involved in Loving 
was to end white supremacy, not to promote interracial marriage, the objective of 
advocates for LGBTQ rights and equality need not be to promote same-sex marriage.
iii. hOW fEdEraL COUrts haVE MisintErprEtEd LOVing
 Loving generated a line of federal court decisions interpreting its civil rights 
dimension grounded in the equal protection clause.184 U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
applying the equal protection clause to government uses of race have perverted the 
central lesson of Loving as a civil rights decision.185 Rather than link invidious racial 
classifications to political subordination as the Loving Court did, subsequent Court 
opinions have wrongly relied on Loving to do just the opposite. Loving has been 
misused to support a colorblind approach to the Fourteenth Amendment that treats 
the government’s use of race to eliminate the contemporary vestiges of Jim Crow as 
equally contemptible as the Jim Crow classifications designed to enforce white rule.
 In the decade following Loving, courts universally rejected race restrictions in 
family law cases because they were “fairly uniformly identified by the courts as 
vestiges of the nation’s Jim Crow past.”186 At the same time, a majority of justices had 
not yet settled on a strictly colorblind approach to affirmative action. The justices’ 
exchange of views surrounding the 1978 decision in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke187 began to reveal fault lines between those who “strongly 
support[ed] or strongly oppos[ed] the application of strict scrutiny to race-based 
affirmative action.”188
 At that juncture, by correctly applying the Loving inquiry into whether the state’s 
policy supported white supremacy, the Court could have chosen to validate race-
based affirmative action efforts while continuing to apply strict scrutiny to race-based 
rules in other contexts. Instead, a majority of justices followed a colorblind political 
183. See Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, in Same-Sex Marriage: Pro 
and Con, supra note 10, at 118–24.
184. See Pascoe, supra note 21, at 304 (“Between 1967 and 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court had cited Loving 
as precedent in 78 different cases, and federal district courts had done so in 362 more  .  .  .  .”); id. at 
305–06 (discussing federal cases involving equal protection and racial classifications).
185. Katie Eyer contrasts the Court’s treatment of race in affirmative action cases and family law cases, 
noting that “during the same time frame that the Supreme Court has increasingly proclaimed the need 
to strictly scrutinize all government uses of race, family law has remained a bastion of racial 
permissiveness.” Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 537, 541 
(2014).
186. Id. at 548–49; see id. at 546 n.20 (citing cases “invalidat[ing] race-based family law restrictions on 
Fourteenth Amendment grounds”).
187. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (holding that a university special admissions program that classified applicants by 
race violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
188. Eyer, supra note 185, at 554 & n.67.
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ideology and subsequently crippled government programs seeking to eliminate the 
vestiges of slavery and Jim Crow.189
 Colorblindness emerged as a conservative strategy after the civil rights movement 
succeeded in toppling the Southern Jim Crow system and forms of de jure segregation 
in the North.190 A backlash movement intent on crushing black empowerment and 
preserving white dominance latched onto the concept of colorblindness as an 
ideological tool of retrenchment. As sociologist Eduardo Bonilla-Silva notes in his 
classic Racism Without Racists, “Much as Jim Crow racism served as the glue for 
defending a brutal and overt system of racial oppression in the pre-civil rights era, 
color-blind racism serves today as the ideological armor for a covert and institutionalized 
system in the post-civil rights era.”191 Colorblind ideology posits that because racism 
no longer impedes minority progress, there is no need for social policies to account for 
race. Pretending that the civil rights movement attained perfect equality ignores the 
lingering effects and systemic incorporation of three centuries of official white 
supremacy as well as newly minted forms of racial discrimination.
 Colorblind ideology has been increasingly embraced by a conservative majority of 
the U.S. Supreme Court.192 A series of Court decisions in the last several decades 
have struck down race-conscious measures to desegregate schools and workplaces 
and to implement voting rights as violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice 
Clarence Thomas articulated the perspective that equates official Jim Crow 
segregation with state efforts to end its legacy, noting a “‘moral and constitutional 
equivalence’ between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute 
benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equality . . . . In 
each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple.”193 According to this 
rationale, both white supremacist and “benign” racial classifications must be subjected 
to strict scrutiny because of the inherent invidiousness of state racial classifications 
and the need for consistency in addressing them.194
189. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Introduction: Awakening After Bakke, 14 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1979) 
(“Minority admissions programs survived the Bakke litigation, but minorities lost the ability to argue 
entitlement to such programs as a matter of legally cognizable right.”); Ian F. Haney Lopez, “A Nation of 
Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 985, 1034 (2007) (“Powell 
effectively argued that for constitutional purposes preferential treatment and Jim Crow laws amounted to 
the same thing—the central claim of reactionary colorblindness.”).
190. See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Racism Without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence 
of Racial Inequality in America (4th ed. 2014); Michael K. Brown et al., Whitewashing Race: 
The Myth of a Color-Blind Society (2003).
191. Bonilla-Silva, supra note 190, at 3.
192. See Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is Color-Blind”, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 2–4 (1991). See 
generally Ian F. Haney Lopez, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (1996).
193. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240–41 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (alteration 
in original) (citation omitted).
194. See Eyer, supra note 185, at 539 (“[T]he Court’s ostensible command has been that even programs 
intended to benefit minority group members—such as affirmative action—must be subjected to the 
same constitutional regime as undoubtedly invidious uses of race.”); see also Adarand Constructors, 515 
U.S. at 230 (explaining “the principle of consistency”).
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 The conservative justices have relied on Loving’s application of strict scrutiny to 
official racial classifications to support their colorblind approach. A host of Supreme 
Court opinions involving civil rights issues such as school desegregation,195 
affirmative action,196 voting rights,197 and equal education,198 cite Loving to invalidate 
state efforts to achieve greater racial equality.
 In Bakke, the Court held that a special admissions program that classified applicants 
by race violated the Fourteenth Amendment.199 Citing Loving, the Court reasoned that 
“[p]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin 
is discrimination for its own sake.”200 Three decades later, in a 5-4 decision striking 
down voluntary plans to desegregate elementary schools in Seattle, Washington and 
Jefferson County, Kentucky, the Court reiterated the position that the Constitution as 
interpreted in Loving requires the government to be colorblind by paying no attention 
to race.201 “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating 
on the basis of race,” Chief Justice John Roberts declared.
 In citing Loving to strike down affirmative action efforts and to support claims 
of reverse discrimination, judges and advocates completely overlook Loving ’s 
connection to the civil rights struggle. The appeal to formal equality to ignore actual 
oppression sounds strikingly similar to the equal application theory posited by 
Virginia in support of its ban on interracial marriage. The Court in Loving rebuffed 
Virginia’s argument that the intermarriage ban was colorblind because blacks and 
whites were equally forbidden from marrying outside their race. Instead of applying 
a theory of formal equality, the justices looked past the law’s veneer of equal treatment 
to the law’s purpose to maintain white supremacy. Thus, far from implementing an 
ideal of colorblindness, the Loving Court explicitly rejected it in favor of an 
examination of the law’s relationship to racial subordination. Instead of following 
Loving’s lead to focus on the law’s relationship to white supremacy, colorblind Court 
decisions ignore white supremacy altogether.
iV. thE COntEMpOrarY iMpOrtanCE Of LOVing as a CiViL rights dECisiOn
 The lessons of Loving as a civil rights decision are especially important in today’s 
supposedly “post-racial” society. The 2008 election of Barack Obama as president 
rejuvenated claims that the United States had overcome its racist past. At the same 
195. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 758 n.10 (2007) (“We 
have insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called ‘benign’ racial classifications.”) (citing 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005)).
196. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200; Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267. 273 (1986); 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 (1978).
197. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 903–04 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
198. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 104–05 (1973).
199. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319–20.
200. Id. at 307.
201. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 758 (2007) (“We have made 
it unusually clear that strict scrutiny applies to every racial classification.”).
206
Loving v. virginia as a CiviL rights DeCision NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 59 | 2014/15
time, a new biopolitics of race is resuscitating in the genomic era the very notion of 
biological racial classifications underlying the anti-miscegenation laws that Loving 
struck down.202 Genomic science and gene-based biotechnologies, such as race-
specific medicines and race-based ancestry testing, are promoting race-consciousness 
at the molecular level at the very moment that the Court and many policymakers are 
rejecting race-consciousness at the social level.
 Gene-based research and biotechnologies are promoting race-consciousness at 
the molecular level by incorporating the assumption that race is a natural, genetically 
determined category.203 Numerous biomedical studies purport to discover the genetic 
origins of racial disparities in the prevalence of common complex diseases such as 
diabetes, cancer, and hypertension.204 In several widely cited articles in prominent 
journals, biomedical researchers argued that it was essential to investigate health-
related genetic differences among racial groups in order to attend to the health 
problems of minority patients effectively and equitably.205 Researchers in the field of 
pharmacogenomics, studying the genetic origins of disease and differential responses 
to treatment, are developing pharmaceuticals designed to treat illness in particular 
racial and ethnic groups.206 In 2005, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
approved the first racially labeled drug, BiDil, to treat heart failure in self-identified 
African American patients.207 In addition, dozens of online companies use genetic 
testing to tell consumers not only their genetic ancestry, but also their racial 
identity.208 This coincidence of rising biological concepts of race alongside a colorblind 
political ideology provides a convenient but false genetic explanation for the persistent 
racial inequities that exist in U.S. society.
 Although the Loving opinion stopped short of refuting the validity of race as a 
biological category, the ACLU and amici argued extensively that the racial 
202. See generally Dorothy Roberts, Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business 
Re-Create Race in the Twenty-First Century (2011); Jonathan Kahn, Race in a Bottle 
(2013) (discussing the expanding use of racial categories in biomedical research). See, e.g., Nicholas 
Wade, A Troublesome Inheritance: Genes, Race and Human History (2014). For a discussion 
on the legal implications of the resurgence of race-based scientific research and biotechnologies, see 
Dorothy E. Roberts, Law, Race, and Biotechnology: Toward a Biopolitical and Transdisciplinary Paradigm, 
9 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 149 (2013).
203. Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 202.
204. See Charmaine D.M. Royal & Gloria M. Dunston, Changing the Paradigm from “Race” to Human 
Genome  Variation,  Nature  Genetics  Supplement, S5 (Nov.  2004),  http://www.nature.com/ng/
journal/v36/n11s/pdf/ng1454.pdf.
205. See, e.g., Esteban G. Burchard et al., The Importance of Race and Ethnic Background in Biomedical Research 
and Clinical Practice, 348 New. Eng. J. Med. 1170 (2003), http://bioethics.stanford.edu/events/
documents/pdfs/burchard.pdf; Neil Risch et al., Categorization of Humans in Biomedical Research: Genes, 
Race and Disease, 3 Genome Biology 1 (2002), http://genomebiology.com/2002/3/7/comment/2007.
206. Kahn, supra note 202, at 1.
207. Id. at 1, 3 –4.
208. Jennifer K. Wagner et al., Tilting at Windmills No Longer: A Data-Driven Discussion of DTC DNA 
Ancestry Tests, 14 Genetics Medicine 586, 586 (2012), http://www.nature.com/gim/journal/v14/n6/
pdf/gim201177a.pdf. 
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classifications the Racial Integrity Act incorporated were scientifically invalid and so 
nonsensical that they rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague.209 At oral 
argument, Philip Hirschkop pointed out that the Virginia legislature “had changed 
the definition of ‘Negro’ from a person with one-eighth Negro blood in 1705 to one-
fourth Negro blood in 1785, and to ‘any trace of Negro blood’ in 1930.’”210 The 
varying legal definitions of racial categories demonstrated their instability and, 
therefore, their scientific indeterminacy.211
 The arguments also reflected the growing scientific consensus that viewed race 
as a social, rather than biological, grouping.212 In 1950, the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) issued a landmark 
“Statement on Race,” declaring that race “is not so much a biological phenomenon as 
a social myth.”213 In its amicus brief in Loving, the NAACP noted that physical 
anthropology and human genetics disproved “three erroneous assumptions” that 
undergirded anti-miscegenation laws: “(1) that ‘pure races’ either exist in the present 
or have existed in the past; (2) that crossing between different racial groups results in 
biologically inferior offspring; and (3) that cultural level is dependent upon racial 
attributes.”214 Also relying on the latest scientific evidence, the NAACP Legal 
Defense and Education Fund concluded, “Clearly, this basis for anti-marriage laws 
rests on theories long deemed nonsensical throughout the world’s community of 
natural scientists.”215 Pointing out the failure of Virginia’s racial classification scheme 
to account for people of Japanese descent, the Japanese American Citizens League 
likewise argued that the law relied on unconstitutionally vague definitions of race.216
209. See Brief of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae at 11–14, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 1967 
WL 113930, at *11–14; Brief of NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., supra note 111, at *10–11; Brief 
of Amici Curiae Japanese Am. Citizens League at 17–23, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 
1967 WL 113928, at *17–23; see also Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 24, 26–28 (Cal. 1948) (finding that racial 
categories used in California’s anti-miscegenation law were “illogical and discriminatory”); Lenhardt, 
supra note 145, at 81 (noting that Justice Roger J. Traynor’s opinion in Perez discussed critically “the 
biological irrelevancy of race”).
210. Fred P. Graham, Marriage Curbs by States Scored: High Court Hears Attack on Virginia Miscegenation Ban, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1967, at 16.
211. On changing legal definitions of race, see generally Lopez, supra note 192, and Ariela J. Gross, 
What Blood Won’t Tell: A History of Race on Trial in America (2008).
212. See Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 202, at 43–49 (“For many scientists . . . the emerging civil 
rights ethos did not make racial science untenable. Rather, it made it imperative for scientists to detach 
their study of biological race from societal racism.”).
213. UNESCO, The Race Question 8 (1950).
214. Brief of the NAACP, supra note 209, at *7.
215. Brief of NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., supra note 111, at *10.
216. The Brief stated:
[I]f a ‘white person’ and a Japanese married while such would be unlawful under § 20-54, 
under the penal provision of § 20-59 only the ‘white person’ would be subject to criminal 
sanctions and the Japanese, being neither a ‘white person’ nor a ‘colored person’ presumably 
would, on the face of things, incur no criminal penalties. But this is far from being clear . . . .
 Brief of Japanese Am. Citizens League, supra note 209, at *16.
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 Chief Justice Warren asked Virginia’s attorney what he thought “of the findings 
of this great committee of UNESCO where . . . about [twenty] of the greatest 
anthropologists in the world joined unanimously in making some very cogent 
findings . . . on the races.”217 But his opinion in Loving failed to denounce the validity 
of racial classifications themselves. The Loving decision would have dealt a more 
profound blow to the Jim Crow regime, as well as its continuing legacy, if it had 
incorporated the arguments made by the ACLU and amici and found that state 
treatment of human beings as biologically distinct races was itself unscientific, 
illogical, and unconstitutionally vague.218 The Court might have rejected the false 
concept of race as a biological category while acknowledging the social reality of race 
as a political grouping. Still, Loving recognized a crucial f law in Virginia’s racial 
classification scheme when it found that its purpose was to maintain white supremacy. 
 In contrast to the Loving litigators’ approach, the ideology that race is important 
to genetics but not to society is spreading in the United States today. The current 
resurgence of genetic definitions of race at a time when a majority of Supreme Court 
justices have embraced a colorblind approach that ignores white supremacy has the 
potential to intensify racial inequality. The coincidence of these two f lawed 
ideologies—that human beings are naturally divided into genetically distinct races 
and that racism has ceased significantly to affect society—reinforces a biological 
explanation for persistent racial inequities. Finding racial differences at the molecular 
level seems to make sense of the paradox of intensifying racial gaps in health, 
economic status, and incarceration since the civil rights movement.
 Race-based genetic research and biotechnologies have tremendous potential to 
affect the direction of state efforts to address these disparities by diverting attention 
from the structural causes of racial inequities toward biological and technological 
explanations and solutions.219 The seemingly colorblind regime of surveillance and 
punishment imposed on poor communities of color may seem more acceptable to 
most Americans as their belief in intrinsic racial differences is validated by genomic 
science and technologies.
 More fundamental than their attitudes about interracial marriage is the question 
of whether Americans have rejected the notions of innate racial difference that 
underpinned anti-miscegenation laws and the racial classifications that supported 
them. It is more urgent than ever to understand race as a political system that helps 
to determine individuals’ status and welfare, and to eliminate the racism that makes 
217. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 105, at *23.
218. See Rachel F. Moran, Love with a Proper Stranger: What Anti-Miscegenation Laws Can Tell Us About the 
Meaning of Race, Sex and Marriage, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 1663, 1678 (2004) (“The Court agreed that 
there was no expert justification for bans on intermarriage, but the Justices were reluctant to dismantle 
race itself.”).
219. See generally Troy Duster, Backdoor to Eugenics (1990); Roberts, Fatal Invention, supra note 
202; see also Kahn, supra note 202, at 199–201 (2013) (discussing the ideologies surrounding the use 
of race-specific medicine, some of which may “promote[] the framing of health disparities in terms that 
locate the problem in the bodies of individual members of geneticized racial groups”). For a discussion of 
proposals to apply strict scrutiny to racial classifications in scientific research, see Roberts, Law, Race, 
and Biotechnology, supra note 202, at 158–59.
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racial classifications useful. We must affirm our common humanity by working to 
end the social injustices preserved by the political system of race. This objective 
requires federal courts to implement, enforce, and uphold strong race-conscious 
remedies for the lasting vestiges of slavery that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
intended to abolish, and King and other civil rights activists fought to eradicate. 
Only then can we hope to create a world where love across what we now see as racial 
barriers is unremarkable.
